This work aims at exploring the relation between Mercosur's political agenda on borders and the local interactions at these spaces in the light of the 'left turn ' in South America (2002. This brief conjuncture analysis found that the 'regionalism by the left' did not foster structural changes in Mercosur nor resolved issues of coordination necessary for the border, regionalization dynamics to leave the informal sphere in which they reside.
Introduction
The present work aims at briefly exploring the relation between Mercosur's institutional political agenda concerning borders and border regions (top-down regional relations) and the local interactions at the 'micro'-level border regions as producers of demands (bottom-up regional relations) in the light of the 'left turn' in South America, in the period of [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] . Beyond the institutionalist analysis, understanding the 'vertical relations' between different levels of the regional process requires looking into the specificities of regional dynamics influenced by the rise of 1 PhD Candidate in Social Sciences at PUCRS (Brazil) and at University of Liège (Belgium). Researcher at the Center for International Relations Studies (CEFIR) and at the International Affairs and Organizations Study Nucleus (NEROI). CAPES Foundation Doctoral Scholar, # 99999.010684/2014-00. Liège, Belgium. progressive (leftist) 2 governments in the mentioned years. Thus, the objective of this work is to explore some of the consequences of this intertwined, intricate, and uneven construction of South America as a region, and more specifically, of Mercosur. That is to say that the investigation will not focus on the processes of institutional (re)construction of Mercosur. Rather, it will aim at the functioning of such institutions that were, in the investigated years, subject to this diverse regional environment, which was built by and through the relations among leftist presidents and their interaction with society at local level.
In order to do this, the article will be divided in three main sections. Firstly, it is necessary to make some conceptual and analytical clarifications on the regionalist process for the case under this work's focus. Secondly, the article will concentrate on the analysis of the consequences of the 'left turn' to regionalism in South America and, more specifically, to Mercosur. Thirdly, this work will put light into the already established institutions within Mercosur that aimed at furthering border integration through the perspective of the politics generated by the presence of progressive governments. Lastly, some final remarks will conclude this study.
Conceptual and analytical clarifications
Borders, here defined as international limits between states, lie in the center of regionalism and regionalization processes due to its singular, diversified, and symbolic roles (HEYMAN & SYMONS, 2012) through which diverse informal social, political, economic, and cultural interactions occur. The concept of 'regionalization', in turn, should be understood as the "informal process of regional interaction (economic, social, cultural, etc.) that takes place beyond the strictly national borders" (CABALLERO, 2015, p. 44) . Regionalization happens then at the local level, as de facto cooperation or integration takes place. These local interactions (bottom-up regional processes) generates an intricate space -the border region -in which local populations are interrelated.
Moreover, there at the border and within the border region "national and subnational governments share responsibilities and jurisdictions, and […] regional organisms play a role of creating norms and of facilitating local processes of cooperation and/or integration" (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2015a) . In other words, borders are also a space in which regionalism takes place. 'Regionalism' here should be defined as "a political project tending to stimulate integration that is, based on the political will of the parties." (CABALLERO, 2015, p. 44 On the other hand, regionalization at border regions had happened, is happening, and will happen beyond the top-level agreements engendered by policymakers, although it is somewhat limited by them. Yet, local cross-border interactions, although informal (and at times illegal) have been used as a source of a regional identity construction, as an origin of shared values and culture, as a basis of a Mercosurness, and above all, as a space for the strengthening of the regional organism.
The relationship between regionalism and regionalization, hence, implies a complex web of top-down and bottom-up regional negotiations (vertical relations) through which political and economic actors, as well as civil societies construct a region beyond (but also through) the process of institutionalization. Among the views shared by the progressive elected presidents, it was central to the 'left agenda' the need for reformulating the role of the State, its optimal dimension, and its intervention mode (COUFFIGNAL, 2013) . Although marked by a high degree of heterogeneity, leftist governments agreed on the necessity of fighting inequality and underdevelopment (DABÈNE, 2012b) . Similarly, they all converged on the essentiality of a more pluralized international relations with less interference of the United States and other great powers in the continent (SANTANDER, 2009) The political will to change the functioning mode of the State also raised interest on decentralization processes, by which governments would become closer to citizens and to their demands, and through which State-level decisions would be better translated into local practices (COUFFIGNAL, 2013) . Historically, however, the few isolated local social policies promoted by national governments did not show to be effective for responding to the demands of local populations, let alone of citizens of Mercosur's borders and border regions.
The progressive regional agenda
In the period studied, South America watched a propagation of decentralized cooperation/integration projects in the heart of the majority of its regional organisms. Mercosur's institutional reaction to regional and local demands was, nonetheless, a late and uneven response to the processes of regionalization. Although the rise of the left did trigger a new approach to regionalism and to regional cooperation/integration strategies by enlarging the scope of regional policies to include more political and social objectives, it did not translate into a deep, structural change within the institutional structure of Mercosur (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA & CULPI, forthcoming). Furthermore, Mercosur's response failed to consider local specificities of the border regions (see in more detail in the next section). Hence, the regional organism did not achieve to further profound changes into the interactions at the local level.
Moreover, the resultant 'overlapping regionalisms' of the 'left turn' were characterized by their fluidity in terms of ideology and of national and regional political projects (RIGGIROZZI, 2010) . Regionalism, thus, coexisted with strong nationalism (CHRISTENSEN, 2007) and generated an complex rivalry for the most prominent view for the whole of South America, comprising Mercosur (CABALLERO, 2015) . The entrance of Venezuela in Mercosur in 2012, in this sense, raised divergences vis-à-vis the consolidation of a single model of regionalism 6 , and even after his passing, president Chávez was able to perpetuate some of his ideas (see GOUVEA & MONTOYA, 2014) . After almost ten years of the first agreements on the matter, SIS-Fronteiras demonstrated similar difficulties to the ones identified previously, with absence of systematic foment to cross-border exchange on public health between bordering 7 Interview with PINTO, José (local politician at the border region of Brazil and Uruguay. Interview #1. [April, 2015] . Interviewer: Gustavo Matiuzzi de Souza. Aceguá/RS, 2015. 1 arquivo .mp3 (60 min.).
The (un)changing reality at the borders
conurbations, low level of involvement by local populations, and big distance between original objectives and reached goals (NOGUEIRA & FAGUNDES, 2014) .
Final remarks
The 'left turn' in South America did provide a new political environment in the regional context. Likewise, it is clear that progressive governments of the period had a regional project in mind. Hence, it is possible to talk about a 'regionalism by the left', that is, a regionalism focused on socio-political dynamics to respond to the diverse and flourishing societal demands of the last decade. The institutional transformations of Mercosur -which for the first time considered, among many other issues, borders and border regions within its framework -were, in this context, the translation of this 'renewed' regionalism into a formal political project.
The political will of leftist national governments in Mercosur, however, were not enough to meet the needs for a structural reform of the organism, especially due to the mounting discomfort to the idea of losing national autonomy and sovereignty.
On the contrary, the strong nationalist vein in the heart of the regionalism by the left diminished the capabilities of furthering cooperation and integration within Mercosur as well as did not improve conditions for further regionalization. Besides, the consequent absence of coordination -probably caused by a leadership problem in Mercosur (cf. MATTLI, 1999 ) -hindered regionalism and its effects on regionalization.
Without implementing deep reforms in the operative system of Mercosur and with the concomitant propensity to deal with local demands via bilateral relations and accords, 'regionalism by the left' did not alter the structure of governance at regional level or at local level (as it had proposed in the Consenso de Buenos Aires). In other words, the development strategy of Mercosur failed to address the issue of inequality and underdevelopment through the engenderment of regional policies.
As for the regionalization dynamics in Mercosur, particularly at the border regions, they seemed to continue residing within informal closed clusters, away from the reality of the top-level discussions and negotiations. BIWG was a good start as an institutionalized forum, but did not provide real opportunities to participate in the decision-making processes.
